Fragile frontiers

On December 2, the Nepalese prime minister left for his first bilateral visit to China, a departure from the usual practice by the Himalayan republic’s leaders of making India their first official destination. Nepali media reported that Nepali Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli—head of the Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), who returned to power in July after two earlier stints as premier—chose Beijing as his first destination due to the absence of a formal invitation from New Delhi. Moreover, Oli has favoured Beijing to reduce the country’s historical reliance on New Delhi. India accounted for nearly 65 per cent of Nepal’s total trade in the 2023-24 fiscal year, according to customs data. By contrast, China’s trade share was about 15 per cent, though Chinese companies lead in some industries including a 70 per cent share of Nepal’s electric vehicle market. Nonetheless, India has the highest foreign investment in Nepal, pumping in more than USD 750 million last year, with China investing more than USD 250 million, according to Nepal’s central bank.

Nepal and China on December 3, 2024, signed a nine-point agreement as Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli met President Xi Jinping in Beijing. Agreements that were signed, among others, include an exchange of letters regarding the construction of the Tokha-Chhahari tunnel road near Kathmandu; an MoU on Nepal-China trade promotion, and an exchange of certificates of completion of the renovation of the historic nine-storey palace situated in Basantapur in Kathmandu. China and Nepal have also signed the framework for Belt and Road Cooperation. In 2017, Nepal had agreed in-principle to be part of China’s mega Belt and Road project—a massive network of roads, transport corridors, airports, and rail lines connecting China with the rest of Asia, Europe and beyond. However, no progress was made in the last seven years because of the lack of a proper framework of executing them. Kathmandu also struggled to find political consensus on the issue, reports NDTV. Nepal and China have identified ten projects for execution under BRI. Experts believe, this could pose a strategic challenge for India while Nepal risks getting into a debt trap.

On December 18, referring to the satellite images, the Hindustan Times reported that China has built at least 22 villages and settlements over the past eight years within territory that has traditionally been part of Bhutan. The report claims that eight villages have been built in areas in proximity to the strategic Doklam plateau since 2020. The location of these villages has alarmed China watchers in New Delhi, especially since the strengthening of the Chinese position in this strategic region could increase the vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor, or the so-called “chicken’s neck”, a narrow stretch of land connecting India’s mainland to the north-eastern states. China has annexed about 825 sq km “that was formerly within Bhutan”, the report claims.

BBIN to BBCN

Nepal and Bhutan are impoverished landlocked nations dominated by their giant neighbours, China and India. Bangladesh’s problem is not that it lacks access to the sea, but flooding from the waters of the Bay of Bengal constantly afflicts the low-lying territory. Most of the major rivers of Bhutan and Nepal flow through India to Bangladesh before discharging water to the Bay of Bengal. Its other geographical problem is that it is almost entirely surrounded by India, because the 2,545-mile long frontier, agreed in 1974, wrapped India around Bangladesh, leaving it only a short border with Burma/Myanmar as an alternative land route to the outside world.

In 1991, Indian Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao initiated the ‘Look East Policy’ to cultivate extensive economic and strategic relations with the nations of Southeast Asia. In the same decade, two more initiatives, namely, Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal (BBIN) and Bangladesh China India Myanmar (BCIM), were taken in the light of economic interdependence demonstrated by “growth triangles” across Asia. Council of Ministers of Nepal, Bhutan, India and Bangladesh approved a sub-regional body as the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ), in May 1996.

The concept of economic cooperation within the BCIM region was first developed by Rehman Sobhan—a Bangladeshi economist, who advocated that multi-modal transport connectivity, supported by other initiatives and infrastructure development, could significantly reduce transaction costs, stimulate trade and investment, and consequently accelerate growth and poverty alleviation in this region. This idea eventually leads to the development of the platform known as the “Kunming Initiative”. The first meeting of the Initiative was convened in 1999.

The Kunming Initiative evolved into the BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation. BCIM came to fruition during the meeting between Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2013. Li’s visit marked the first time high-ranking officials had discussed the trade corridor. Furthermore, earlier in the year, the first ever BCIM car rally was held between Kolkata and Kunming, via Dhaka, to highlight road connectivity in the four countries. In 2015, China proposed including the BCIM corridor as part of its vision for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi’s signature global connectivity initiative.

When the Modi government came to power in 2014, India became sceptical about the BCIM initiative. Pro Modi think tanks claimed that China has a special interest with the BCIM economic corridor. This is with relation to the development of the relatively less developed Yunnan province by connecting it with other parts of the South Asia, and developing it as a major economic hub. Even further, China’s other interest in the BCIM emerges from the perspective of the labour cost. China envisages a future with rising labour cost, which might negatively affect labour-intensive industries like textile and agro-processing. As rational economic agents, China will definitely intend to transfer these industries to hubs of lower labour costs.

On the other hand, there has been a renewed interest among policy academics to discuss the potential of BBIN as the new emerging economic order of South Asia. They often referred to a study (2014) by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) which proposed 10 regional road networks as South Asian Corridors (SAC). Out of ten such corridors, seven had been identified in the BBIN region. They argued that the land-locked trading centres of Nepal and Bhutan can get access to ports in India and Bangladesh. Tripura can get access to Bangladesh’s Ashugunj port; and Chittagong and Mongla ports can be accessed to move food grain from Kolkata to the North-East.

The opening of the Bangabandhu Bridge over the Jamuna River (the Jamuna multipurpose bridge) and the development of the Padma Bridge, the Dhaka-Chittagong transport corridor, and other strategic transport corridors were expected to facilitate trade between Bangladesh and India’s North-East and West Bengal. Faced with choices of being part of two regional blocs: BBIN and BCIM, India opted for the first, and signed the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) on June 15, 2015 at Thimphu. Thus, the initiatives on the BCIM Corridor were abandoned.

The BBIN initiative was part of the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme, which brings together, apart from the BBIN countries, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Myanmar in projects-based partnerships. With Myanmar being added to the SASEC initiative, ADB wants the nation to act as the bridge between the BBIN network and Southeast Asia as well as with China and global markets, and beyond. On October 3, Nepal, India and Bangladesh signed a tripartite agreement to facilitate cross-border electricity trade. As per the agreement, Nepal will export its surplus electricity to Bangladesh via India from June 15 to November 15 every year. India will make arrangements to supply electricity from Nepal to Bangladesh. In the first phase, Nepal will export 40 MW of hydroelectricity to Bangladesh via Indian Territory.

Nonetheless, BBIN-MVA was signed at Thimphu in 2015, Bhutan has held back on ratifying the agreement. Till now, Bhutan participates as an observer at BBIN meetings. During the last BBIM Countries’ meet at Dhaka, in March 2024, on the progress of the BBIN MVA, Bhutan participated as an observer but refrained from ratifying the MVA. Closer ties of Bhutan with China may have effectively converted the BBIN bloc into BBCN corridor—replacing India with China.

Observations

None of the three smaller south Asian countries, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, ‘can ever rise to threaten its undisputed master’(India), wrote Tim Marshall (2015) in his book: Prisoners of Geography –Ten Maps that Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics. This perception about ‘Master-Dependent’ binary towards smaller neighbours needs to be changed, sooner the better. There’s a debate about whether India is emerging as a bully to its smaller neighbours including Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal.

Interestingly, Bangladesh Bhutan and Nepal meet each other at a common border at Siliguri Corridor, also known as the Chicken’s Neck. It is a stretch of land (20–22 kilometres) around the city of Siliguri in West Bengal that connects India’s northeastern states to the rest of India. At its narrowest, the corridor is just 17 km wide. This makes Siliguri corridor a prisoner of geography and makes it very vulnerable to external forces.

It needs to be flagged that non-state armed actors in Northeast India are still a major issue and the formation of states as means of democratisation has been unable to curb their activities. South Asia Terrorism Portal (stap.org) has identified thirty five ‘active terrorist/insurgent groups’ in Northeast India. A few prominent names are: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), Hmar People’s Convention-Democracy (HPC-D), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), IK Songbijit faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S), United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), People’s Democratic Council of Karbi-Longri (PDCK), Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), National Revolutionary Front of Manipur (NRFM), Kuki National Liberation Front (KNLF), Dimasa National Liberation Army (DNLA). Under such a condition, the democratic states of Northeast India continue to function in a well militarised environment, where large scale deployment of security forces is considered as a necessity to contain the non-state armed actors. Experience has proved that the formation of states as the process of democratisation is yet to soothe the conflict in the region, observes Athikho Kaisii in Asian Review Vol. 36(2), 2023. Prolonged ethnic violence in Manipur strengthens this observation. Political instability in the neighbouring countries of Bangladesh and Myanmar is a major cause of concern for the Indian government.

It is alleged that China has “exploited” the sense of alienation and insecurity among tribal communities along the India-Myanmar border in order to “cause insurgency and instability” in north-eastern India. A research paper claimed that the insurgents sourced their arms from China and brought them into India via Myanmar.

Reports suggest that Bangladesh also harboured various anti-Indian insurgent groups in their soil. According to the institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, India had lodged specific complaints against the existence of terrorist camps in Hobiganj, Maulvi Bazaar, Chittagong and Satcherri districts of Bangladesh, among others, along the Indian border. India had pointed out the existence of 100 to 150 such camps to Bangladesh, pinpointing their location. The Camps were allegedly run by terrorist groups active in Northeast India including the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), active in Assam, and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) those were active in Tripura. Earlier this year, Assam Police arrested two Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) operatives, Bahar Mia and Rarely Mia, at the Guwahati railway station, underscoring the persistent threat posed by such networks. ABT, a known affiliate of Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), has been linked to several terror activities.

In a significant development, on December 17, 2024, Paresh Baruah, the military commander of the banned terror organisation United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), has been granted relief by a Bangladesh High Court. Baruah, who had been sentenced to death in connection with a high-profile arms smuggling case, saw his sentence commuted to life imprisonment. The case dates back to April 1, 2004, when a massive consignment of weapons was intercepted in Chittagong, during the regime of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami. Paresh Baruah, who was convicted for his role in the arms smuggling plot, is believed to be operating out of China, reports Business Today.

The Modi government, after coming to power through a landslide victory in 2014, changed India’s Look East Policy’ to “Act East Policy”. Addressing the East Asia Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, PM Modi told the audience that his government had accorded high priority to turn India’s look East Policy to Act East Policy. Unfortunately, during the last one decade his ‘Act East Policy’ has become defunct along with the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). With its Secretariat in Dhaka, BIMSTEC member countries are India, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Nepal and Sri Lanka. At present, China enjoys much warmer relations with the BIMSTEC and BBIM members than India enjoys with her partner countries.

One decade of Modi’s flawed foreign policy has made India’s neighbours, with whom the country enjoyed historical economic and cultural ties, friendlier to China. Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal (BBIN) sub regional corridor has effectively become Bangladesh Bhutan China Nepal (BBCN) sub-regional group, making the entire northeast India vulnerable to external threats. Existence of huge numbers of stateless Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has aggravated the danger.

Views expressed are personal