Drifting apart?

Since August 2024, Bangladesh has been at the crossroads, as an interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, is facing an uphill task to stabilize the political crisis in the absence of an elected government. Widespread allegations of systematic persecution of religious minorities – mostly Hindus — has pushed Bangladesh into a crisis situation which demands strong political leadership. Ms Hasina’s dramatic ouster on August 5 followed weeks of student-led protests which spiralled into deadly, nationwide unrest. On that fateful day she hurriedly left the country and landed at a military base near Delhi. Since then she has been staying in India. Dr Yunus has alleged that Ms Hasina is continuing her political activities from India.

With Ms Hasina’s fall, Delhi’s “neighbourhood first” policy has taken another jolt with Bangladesh joining Nepal in resisting any attempt at dominance by India, writes BBC. Reacting to India’s Bangladesh policy, a top BNP leader and former Cabinet minister Abdul Moyeen Khan has commented that India’s foreign policy bureaucrats in South Block made a “massive policy blunder” and a “political blunder” by deciding to put “all its eggs in one basket”; there is “immediate need” for India to have a “renewed look” at its Bangladesh policy in this “hour of crisis”, reports The Indian Express. Unfortunately India has not shown any such endeavour.

Bangladesh shares a 4,096-kilometre long land border with five Indian states – West Bengal (2217 km), Tripura (856 km), Meghalaya (443 km), Mizoram (318 km) and Assam (262 km). India and Bangladesh share bonds of history, language, culture, and a multitude of other commonalities — like shared eco-system. After Hasina’s Awami League party came to power in 2009, India has given more than USD 7bn (since 2010), as a line of credit to Bangladesh for infrastructure and development projects.

Bangladesh is India’s biggest trading partner in the subcontinent. The total Indo-Bangla trade turnover in FY23 touched to USD 14.22 billion. India exported 6,052 commodities to Bangladesh in FY23 which amounted to USD 12.20 billion. And India’s imports from Bangladesh stood at USD 2.02 billion. In addition to the formal trade, Bangladesh-India informal trade is estimated at USD 11 billion. It is feared that a strong anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh will have a serious impact on economy and trade, especially in the Border States like West Bengal.

Yunus’ predicament

In addition to the strained relation with India, Yunus has two other major challenges— (i) establishing a good relation with the new US administration under President Trump, and (ii) solving the Rohingya refugee crisis at the earliest.

After the re-election of Donald Trump, Muhammad Yunus — who is closely associated with Democrats — may find it tough to deal with the new US president. Nonetheless, he congratulated the US President-elect on his election victory mentioning that Bangladesh and the US “share a long history of friendship and collaboration across numerous areas of mutual interest”. It may be recalled that in 2016, when Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton, Muhammad Yunus, a “dear friend” of Clinton, reacted with stark disappointment, calling Trump’s victory in the US presidential election “a solar eclipse … black days”. Sending Diwali greetings, Donald Trump condemned the attack on Hindus in Bangladesh and vowed to strengthen ties with India.

The Rohingya refugee crisis is a time bomb that must be quickly diffused to avoid any future flare up which will have disastrous political impact. Over one million Rohingya refugees — the world's largest stateless population — mostly Muslim, now stay in Bangladesh. They started fleeing to Bangladesh in 2016 to escape genocide at the hands of Buddhist-majority Myanmar’s military. Observers warn that a worse conflict between locals and refugees is inevitable without a concerted effort to solve the long pending issue. Filthy refugee camps in Bangladesh risk morphing into epicentres of extremism similar to those seen in Palestine in the Middle East, writes the Asia Times. Thousands of Rohingya insurgents have emerged from refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, where militant recruitment and violence have surged this year, mostly by the Myanmar Military junta, to wage a united front against the non-state insurgent group Arakan Army (AA) who are backed by the majority Buddhist ethnic Rakhine community that includes people who joined the military in purging the Muslim Rohingyas in 2017 genocide, reports The Hindu.

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Bangladesh-China-Myanmar (BCM) — a new geo strategic axis

Bangladesh’s Rohingya refugees are expected to play an important role, alongside military junta, in tackling the Arakan Army that has practically taken control of the Rakhine state. Military forces have found themselves cornered by this insurgent group. In an effort to retaliate, the junta is allegedly recruiting Muslim Rohingya, from the stateless minority refugees. The tactic is regarded as a ploy to incite conflict between the Rohingya and the majority Buddhist Rakhine (Arakanese) population.

China has immensely invested in Rakhine state — strategically very important province for the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) which will provide quick sea access for China’s landlocked western provinces, connecting them to the Bay of Bengal. The CMEC is an important part of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Initially it was part of the broader Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). But the project encountered a setback when India hesitated to start implementation amidst growing geopolitical rivalry with China. Then the CMEC was formalised with the signing of a 15-point Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on September 9, 2018 between China and Myanmar. China’s major infrastructure investments in Myanmar, including the Kyaukphyu SEZ and the deep-sea port, now face the daunting task of steering the escalating conflict throughout Myanmar.

On December 26, 2023, the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime in Myanmar inked with China an addendum to the concession agreement for the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and its deep-sea port. This deep-sea port, coupled with the SEZ, is a critical component of the ambitious China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). Both are located in the conflict hit Rakhine state, bordering Bangladesh, where the Arakan Army runs a de-facto administration.

For the sake of its ambitious CMEC project, China now wants to develop good relations with the Myanmar military junta and Bangladesh’s interim government. China-initiated BCIM-EC has emerged into BCM-EC. The stateless Rohingya refugees and strained personal relations between Dr Yunus and incumbent US President Trump – a declared China hawk — are playing significant roles in this new alignment.

The signs of this transformation are very clear. In November, China welcomed Myanmar’s military leader Min Aung Hlaing on his first visit to China since the military coup in 2021. Then a four-member delegation from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) also visited China at the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Currently a 14-member team led by Jamaat-e-Islami’s central leaders is in China on the invitation of CCP.

China’s export to Bangladesh was USD 22.95 billion during 2023, nearly double of India’s export to Bangladesh. The defence relationship between China and Bangladesh was significantly strengthened with the signing of a comprehensive defence cooperation agreement in 2002. Now 72 per cent of Bangladesh's arms imports are sourced from China. Clearly, like the economy, defence trade forms a critical component of the China-Bangladesh bilateral relationship.

It appears, India has pushed another trusted neighbour in Bangladesh to China.

Views expressed are personal