West Asia's Geopolitical Reset

The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, has long been a symbol of the intense and multifaceted geopolitical contest in West Asia. Some commentators across the globe were speculating that Bashar al-Assad’s regime has “won” the civil war, especially after his re-entry into the Arab League in May 2023. However, the reality was far different. The collapse of Assad’s authority in December 2024 within a matter of weeks, following an unexpected and rapid offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist group previously linked to Al-Qaeda, exposed how vulnerable the Syrian regime was.

Despite having retained control over large parts of Syria, the regime was never truly stable or self-sufficient. Assad’s hold on power, especially post-2011, was more for survival than victory. He relied heavily on external support, particularly from Russia and Iran and, both ensured its continued existence through military, financial, and political support. The Syrian Arab Army’s rapid disintegration underscored the lack of cohesion within Assad military apparatus, signalling the regime’s inability to function without any foreign intervention.

The absence of key international players like Iran-backed Hezbollah and Russia, which had previously supported Assad, played a crucial role in tipping the scales. Hezbollah, emasculated by its ongoing confrontation with Israel, was unable to provide the same level of assistance it had in the past. Similarly, Russia, embroiled in its war against Ukraine, was perhaps reluctant to expend resources on Syria at a time when its own interests were under strain.

Türkiye, meanwhile, seized the opportunity to support the opposition forces, signalling a shift in the regional balance of power. The Turkish government had long been opposed to Assad’s regime and, with Russia and Hezbollah distracted, decided to back the anti-Assad forces. This led to a rapid breakdown of the regime’s territorial control and eventually the fall of Damascus, marking the end of over five decades of Assad family rule. The removal of Assad provides Türkiye with more space and autonomy to deal with the Kurdish movement effectively which it perceives as a grave threat to its national security.

Internally, the fall of Assad’s regime was met with a mixture of optimism and uncertainty. For many Syrians, especially those who had suffered under Assad’s brutal rule, the collapse of his government was a moment of hope. However, for minority communities, particularly the Shia and Alawite populations who had backed Assad, the situation was fraught with danger. These groups seem to face the prospect of being marginalized or persecuted by the incoming Sunni-majority forces. This is indicative of the sectarian tensions that continue to rule the Syrian conflict and highlight the challenges that any new government will face in maintaining unity in a deeply divided country.

One of the most significant consequences of Assad’s fall is the weakening of Iran and its broader regional strategy, often referred to as the “Axis of Resistance”. Iran has long viewed Syria as a crucial part of its regional influence, serving as a critical corridor for the transfer of arms, fighters, and money to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This “Shia crescent” extends from Iran through Iraq and Syria, culminating in Lebanon. Syria has acted as a conduit for Iranian military support to Hezbollah, enabling Tehran to extend its reach and maintain a strategic foothold near Israel.

With Assad’s regime ousted, Iran faces a massive blow to its ability to sustain this supply line. The loss of control over Syria limits Iran’s ability to arm and fund Hezbollah, its most powerful proxy in the region. This not only disrupts Iran’s military operations in Lebanon but also weakens its ability to project power in the wider region, particularly in its efforts to counterbalance Israel’s influence in West Asia. The collapse of the Assad regime also dealt a strategic blow to Iran’s aim of creating a contiguous land corridor to the Mediterranean, which had been central to its vision of regional dominance.

In the days following the collapse of the regime, Israel launched a series of airstrikes across Syria, targeting military installations and expanding its control in the Golan Heights. Israel’s decision to act swiftly reflects its longstanding concerns about Iranian influence in Syria and its desire to safeguard its security interests. The Israeli government has long viewed the Assad regime, with its close ties to Iran and Hezbollah, as a direct threat. With Assad’s downfall, Israel may now see an opportunity to reshape the regional balance of power in its favour, even as it risks further destabilizing the region.

The fall of the Assad regime also represents a significant shift in the geopolitics of West Asia. The region already marred by many conflicts now faces the prospect of a further power vacuum in Syria. Countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which had previously sought to reintegrate Assad into the Arab fold, must now reassess their policies. Countries like Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan, which had aligned themselves with Assad in recent years, are now forced to navigate the delicate balance between containing the threat posed by Islamist groups and ensuring that the Syrian crisis does not spill over into their territories and that the power vacuum does not give rise to further instability.

India, which has maintained a neutral stance in the Syrian conflict, now faces new challenges in its relationship with Syria and its allies. India has traditionally focused on safeguarding its interests in West Asia, particularly in terms of energy security and the safety of its large diaspora. India’s historical ties with the Assad regime, particularly in terms of defence and trade, will be tested as it reassesses its engagement with Syria in a post-Assad world. Moreover, India will need to closely monitor the rise of Islamist groups like HTS, which could have implications for the broader security situation in the region, especially in terms of counterterrorism efforts.

The writer is a retired IPS officer, Adviser NatStrat, and a former National Security Advisor in Mauritius. Views expressed are personal