Battle for Regional Legitimacy

The 6th Summit of the Heads of State/Government of the member States of BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) was held on April 4, 2025, in Bangkok, Thailand. The Summit was attended by the Heads/leaders of the respective member nations, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. An agreement on Maritime Transport Cooperation has been signed to strengthen regional partnerships to enhance maritime connectivity, enabling more trade and travel amongst the member States. In addition, the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between BIMSTEC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which institutionalises future partnership between IORA and BIMSTEC in key areas of shared interest, was signed. ‘BIST-EC’ (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation) – a sub-regional organization, came into being in June 1997. Following the inclusion of Myanmar, it was renamed ‘BIMST-EC’ in December 1997 through the Bangkok Declaration. With the admission of Nepal and Bhutan, the name of the grouping was changed to ‘Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation’ (BIMSTEC) during its 1st Summit (2004) in Bangkok. Since then, only six Summits have been held, which reflects poor coordination among member nations of this South Asian sub-regional group.

Surprisingly, Myanmar junta Chief Min Aung Hlaing has participated in the BIMSTEC Summit and met, among others, with Indian PM Narendra Modi, who expounded on the early restoration of the democratic process in the country through “inclusive and credible elections”. The decision by Thailand to welcome the general to the BIMSTEC Summit has been widely criticized as legitimising the regime and its brutal repression of citizens. Since the February 2021 coup, the junta has faced growing diplomatic isolation in Southeast Asia. While ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) has stopped short of imposing formal sanctions on General Min Aung Hlaing, it has persistently excluded his regime from key meetings, allowing only non-political representatives to participate. The bloc has also urged the junta to prioritise inclusive dialogue over its planned elections and to halt violent crackdowns on civilians. BIMSTEC is strategically important to India as its neighbour, Myanmar, acts as a bridge between India and ASEAN. However, political instability in Myanmar and China’s increasing presence in the Bay of Bengal region, using the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), have marginalised India’s role in BIMSTEC.

Since 2014, after the Modi government came to power in India, the SAARC has been made defunct. The much-hyped ‘Look East Policy’ of the previous government has also been practically abandoned after renaming it as ‘Act East Policy’, in 2014, as an enhanced version of the “Look East Policy” which aimed at strengthening economic, cultural, and strategic ties with Southeast Asian countries and the wider Indo-Pacific region! The construction of the 1300-km India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, which began in 2002, is yet to be completed due to the political situation in Manipur and Myanmar. The Kaladan Multi-Modal project to link Kolkata to Mizoram via Myanmar launched in 2010, also remains incomplete. The future of India’s Act East Policy, if the Modi government decides to revive it, depends on how political unrest in Myanmar is resolved and to what extent China gets involved in shaping the economic and strategic future of Bangladesh.

Myanmar civil war

Since orchestrating the 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military leader, General Min Aung Hlaing, has led a violent crackdown on pro-democracy forces, deepening the country’s political and humanitarian crisis. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reported 29 arrests by the junta until December 2024. By January 2025, studies, including one by the BBC, estimate that the military retains control over only 21 per cent of Myanmar’s territory, primarily key urban centers. Opposing the junta is the National Unity Government (NUG), formed in April 2021 by ousted officials, ethnic minorities, and activists. Its armed wing, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), works closely with numerous ethnic rebel groups. Among them, the Three Brotherhood Alliance — comprising the Arakan Army (AA), MNDAA, and TNLA — launched Operation 1027 in October 2023, targeting junta forces. By late 2024, the AA controlled 13 of 17 townships in Rakhine State and advanced toward Sittwe and Kyaukphyu — areas with significant Indian and Chinese infrastructure investments, including the China-backed Belt and Road Initiative. Reports also confirm AA’s control over 10 of 11 Chinese-backed projects in the region. On March 28, a devastating earthquake struck largely junta-held regions, compounding instability. Meanwhile, ethnic forces like the Chin Brotherhood have captured strategic towns such as Falam, raising the stakes in the ongoing conflict. The future of Chinese infrastructure projects and the fate of nearly one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh now hinge on how China negotiates with both the junta and ethnic rebel forces to bring an end to Myanmar’s deepening civil war.

Rising distrust between India and Bangladesh

Growing distrust between Bangladesh and India, two other founder members of BIMSTEC, is also helping China to exert deeper and wider influence in the Bay of Bengal region. As India’s faulty Bangladesh policy has created an atmosphere of suspicion between the two neighbours, the chief advisor of Bangladesh’s interim government, Mohammed Yunus, has taken full advantage of it to position his country as China’s gateway to South Asia. During his recent visit to China he suggested that since India’s north-eastern states are landlocked with no access to the sea, Bangladesh is the only guardian “of the ocean in this region” and therefore “could be an extension of the Chinese economy — building, producing, and marketing goods for China and the world.”

Nine agreements were signed on March 28, ranging from economic cooperation to cultural exchange. The eight memorandums of understanding (MoUs) signed -- spanning translation, sports, media, and healthcare — reflect a softer, long-term strategy to deepen cultural ties and build mutual understanding. During a meeting with the Chinese President, Bangladesh invited China’s involvement in the Teesta River project, a special economic zone in Chattogram, the Mongla Port expansion, and discussions on acquiring fighter jets. As a retaliatory measure, the Indian government terminated, on April 8, the trans-shipment facility, provided by India to Bangladesh in June 2020, which enabled smooth trade flows for Bangladesh’s exports to countries like Bhutan, Nepal, and Myanmar.

Analysts anticipate that the Mongla Port modernization and proposed industrial zones promise job creation, increased investment, and progress toward Bangladesh’s aspiration to become a regional manufacturing hub.

In the near future, China might extend the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) to Bangladesh and create a seamless China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBEC) to cater to its growing Indian market.

Views expressed are personal