The downlisting of Rafale and Eurofighter from amongst a selection of five of the six medium, multirole combat aircrafts (MMRCA) that matched the Request for Proposal (RFP) was a “tough task” undertaken by the technical evaluation committee (TEC) led by the director general (acquisition) of the defence ministry. A former senior air force officer said this recently.
Rafale had a initial price advantage over Eurofighter costing just over Rs 10 billion for 126 aircrafts for 2006 when they responded to the RFP, which progressively went up to Rs 12 billion and then an eventual cost escalation to Rs 20-25 billion being considered at the lengthy negotiation process.
For the new Narendra Modi government, this level of cost for the fleet of aircrafts was unsustainable. He, along with the Defence Minister Arul Jaitley and later Manohar Parrikar, would have had to fall for it hook, line and sinkers. Or, Modi could have decided to scrap the deal fully.
The first decision point would have meant a huge hole in the exchequer. And the second, would have meant that India would become a pariah State in the eyes of the global arms manufacturing countries.
Instead, Modi government chose the prudent path of buying 36 Rafales in a government-to-government deal that at the current rupee rate would cost Rs 1000-1200 crores per aircraft. While this itself is a high price to pay, it still helped maintain a good relation with a nation that has been the first Western country to sell India fighter jets outside of the USSR block. On the other hand, it opened up the option for the country to go for a lower priced fighter jet in the light category that is 20 tonnes or less.
This will also mean that the IAF’s woes with the light combat aircraft (LCA) could be resolved if the foreign government selling the fighter helps Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) in building a robust Mark II of the LCA and also a manufacturing base with substantial technology transfer.
So, the current pressure being built by the IAF for keeping its squadron strength level at a reasonably formidable level as a “strategic force” in being viewed as an effort to choose this option of contracting for a non-Rafale option.